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Abstract. 
 
Information has become the most precious resource of society. At 
the same time, there is no consensus on the meaning of the term 
“information,” and many researchers have considered problems of 
information definition. This results in a quantity of contradictions, 
misconceptions, and paradoxes related to the world of information. To 
remedy the situation, a new approach in information theory, which is 
called the general theory of information, is developed. The main 
achievement of the general theory of information is explication of a 
relevant and adequate definition of information. This theory is built on an 
axiomatic base as a system of two classes of principles and their 
consequences. The first class consists of the ontological principles, which 
are revealing general properties and regularities of information and its 
functioning. Principles from the second class explain how to measure 
information. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Foundations of a scientific discipline is a systematic analysis of the most basic or 
fundamental concepts of this scientific discipline, that results in demonstration of 
fundamentality of the considered concepts, building theoretical (often 
mathematical) models for the concepts, finding properties of these concepts, and 
establishing the rules of operation with these concepts. For instance, foundations 
of mathematics studies structures that are used to build the whole mathematics, 
their properties and operations with them. There are set-theoretical, named-set-
theoretical, categorical, algorithmic, and logical foundations of mathematics. 
For information theory, the most basic is the concept of information. However, 
kinds and types of information and its theoretical representations form an 
extensive diversity of phenomena, concepts, formulas, and ideas. This inspired 
many researchers to argue that it is impossible to develop a unified definition of 
information (Belkin, 1978; Belkin and Robertson, 1976). In particular, the most 
prominent researcher in the field of information science, Claude Shannon, wrote 
(cf., (Shannon, 1993)) that it was hardly to be expected that a single concept of 
information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of 
the general field of information theory. 
A persuasive argument for impossibility to give such a unified definition is 
given in   (Capurro, Fleissner and Hofkirchner, 1999). This result and many other 
arguments (cf., for example, (Melik-Gaikazyan, 1997)) undermine generality of 
conventional definitions of information and imply impossibility of a universal 
definition of information. 
At the same time, information has become the leading force in contemporary 
society (Bell, 1980) and rational development of information economy needs 
sound foundations, including a relevant comprising definition of information 
(Arrow, 1979; 1984; Godin, 2008). One more problem is to find adequate 
relations between data, knowledge, and information (Ackoff, 1989). 
Nevertheless, it has become possible to synthesize all directions and 
approaches in information studies and to find a solution to the important problem 
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of understanding what information is in the general theory of information. This 
was achieved in the general theory of information (Burgin, 1994; 1995; 2001; 
2002; 2003; 2004) through utilization of a new definition type. Namely, to 
overcome limitations of the conventional approaches and to solve the problem of 
information definition a parametric definition is used in the general theory of 
information. Parametric systems (parametric curves, equations, functions, etc.) are 
frequently used in mathematics and its applications. For instance, a parametric 
curve in a plane is defined by two functions f(t) and g(t), while a parametric curve 
in space has the following form: (f(t), g(t), h(t) ) where parameter t takes values in 
some interval of real numbers. 
Parameters used in mathematics and science are, as a rule, only numerical and 
are considered as quantities that define certain characteristics of systems. For 
instance, in probability theory, the normal distribution has as parameters the mean 
µ and the standard deviation σ. A more general parameter, functional, is utilized 
for constructing families of non-Diophantine arithmetics (Burgin, 1997a; 2001a).   
In the case of the general theory of information, the parameter is even more 
general. The parametric definition of information utilizes a system parameter. 
Namely, an infological system plays role of a parameter that discerns different 
kinds of information, e.g., social, personal, chemical, biological, genetic, or 
cognitive, and combines all of the in one general concept “information”.  
The general theory of information is based on a system of principles. There are 
two groups of such principles: ontological and axiological. These principles single 
out what is information describing its properties, and thus, form foundations for 
information theory. 
 
2. Ontological Principles of Information Theory 
The main question here is "What is information?" To answer this question, we 
start with describing the basic properties of information in the form of ontological 
principles.  
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Ontological Principle O1 (the Locality Principle). It is necessary to separate 
information in general from an information (or a portion of information) for a 
system R. In other words, empirically, it is possible to speak only about 
information (or a portion of information) for a system.  
Why is this principle so important? The reason is that all conventional theories 
of information assume that information exists as something absolute like time in 
the Newtonian dynamics. Consequently, it is assumed that this absolute 
information may be measured, used, and transmitted. On the abstract level, it is 
possible to build such a mathematical model that makes sense of absolute 
information, but in practical environment, or as scientists say, empirically, this is 
not so.  
To demonstrate this, let us consider the following situation. We have a book in 
Japanese and want to ask what information it contains. For a person who does not 
know Japanese, it contains no information. At the same time, its information for 
those who know Japanese may be immense. 
Another situation: let us consider a textbook, for example, in mathematics. If it 
is a good textbook, then it contains a lot of information for a mathematics student. 
However, if we show this book to a professional mathematician, she or he might 
say, “Oh, I know everything in this book, so it contains no information for me.” 
We will have the same result but for a different reason if we give this book to 
an art student who is bored with mathematics. 
To make situation more evident, imagine a completely deaf and blind person 
who comes to a movie theater without any devices to compensate his deficiencies. 
How much information this person will get there? 
It is interesting that the Ontological Principle O1 demonstrates tendencies and 
changes similar to those that were prevalent in theoretical physics in the 20th 
century. Classical Newtonian-Laplacian physics is global, that is, all is the same 
whatever place in the universe we take. New physics has developed more refined 
methods. Relativity theory states that inertial systems that move with different 
speeds have different time. Quantum electrodynamics models quantum 
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phenomena by gauge fields, which are invariant with respect to local 
transformations. 
Definition 1. The system R with respect to which some information is 
considered is called the receiver, receptor or recipient of this information. 
Such a receiver/recipient can be a person, community, class of students, 
audience in a theater, animal, bird, fish, computer, network, database and so on. 
Necessity to have a receiver stated in the Ontological Principle O1 implies, as 
Buckland (1991) explains, "that the capability of being informative, the essential 
characteristic of information-as-thing, must also be situational". In this context, to 
be informative for people means to have an answer to somebody's question. The 
informativeness, in the sense of Buckland (1991), is a relation between the 
question and the thing. Thus, there is no such a thing that is inherently 
informative. To consider something as information for an individual or group of 
people is always to consider it as informative in relation to some possible 
questions of this individual or group.  We do not always realize this, because it is 
mostly assumed. It is assumed, for example, that a paper about the Sun may help 
answering questions about the Sun. It is less obvious, however, that a  meteorite 
from outer space may answer questions about the origin of life. A good deal of 
scientific knowledge is needed to understand why this is the case (and a claim 
about the informativeness of something is knowledge-dependent and may turn out 
to be wrong). In a wider sense, background knowledge is always important for a 
person to extract information from any object (including documents and texts).  
The Ontological Principle O1 well correlates with the assumption of Dretske 
(1981) that information is always relative to a receiver's background knowledge. 
Some believe that dependence on prior knowledge in information extraction 
brings us to subjectivity in defining information and becomes the source of 
elusiveness of the concept of information (von Baeyer, 2004). Thus, the first 
impression is that the Ontological Principle O1 supports this subjective approach 
to the concept of information. However, in this case, subjectivity is confused with 
relativity. The Ontological Principle O1 states that information has to be 
considered not in the absolute way, as the majority of researchers in the field are 
 6 
doing, but as a relative essence properties of which depend on a chosen system. 
Dependence on an individual is usually called subjectivity. However, subjectivity 
is what depends only on the opinion of an individual. At the same time, 
information for a person A does not necessary coincides with what A thinks about 
information for herself or himself. For instance, A listens to a lecture and thinks 
that he gets a lot of information from it. This is a subjective estimate of 
information in the lecture. Nevertheless, if A forgets all he had heard the next day, 
the lecture actually has no information for A. This is an objective estimate of 
information in the lecture.  
Another situation is when a person B reads some mathematical paper and finds 
nothing interesting there. Then B thinks that she has received no information from 
this paper. This is a subjective estimate of information in the paper. However, if B 
remembers something connected to this paper, then objectively she gets 
information from the text. Moreover, it is possible that B finds after some time 
that ideas from that paper are very useful for her work. This changes the 
subjective estimate of the paper and B starts to think that that paper contained a lot 
of useful information. Moreover, as axiological principles considered in (Burgin, 
1995; 1997) show, for person B, information in that paper objectively also grows. 
This demonstrates that both objective and subjective estimates of information for 
a recipient depend not only on the recipient but also on time, interaction between 
the recipient and the carrier of information, work of this recipient and some other 
parameters. 
Thus, information has objective but relativistic properties and their subjective 
estimates. This well correlates with the situation in the classical physics where 
objectivity is the pivotal principle. 
The very fact that we treat science as a method of handling human experience 
inevitably involves the presence of observer in scientific theories (Lindsay, 1971). 
This allows us to better understand the role of the observer in interpretations of 
quantum theory. What seemingly began as a technical measurement problem in a 
specific area became gratuitously generalized into a metaphysical assertion that 
"observer-created" reality is all the reality that exists. The positivist idea that it is 
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meaningless to discuss the existence of something which cannot be measured 
(position and velocity, within certain limits) has been developed into the idea that 
subatomic particles are unreal, formal structures, which only achieve actuality 
upon observation. In such a way, positivism became transformed into 
subjectivism (and even, solipsism), promoting the idea that the observer somehow 
creates reality by the act of observation. Heisenberg first stated that the electron 
does not have a well-defined position when it is not interacting. The next step in 
this direction is called the relational interpretation of quantum reality (Rovelli, 
1996).  It states that, even when interacting, the position of the electron is only 
determined in relation to a certain observer, or to a certain quantum reference 
system, or similar. 
As Rovelli writes (1996), in physics, the move of deepening our insight into the 
physical world by relativizing notions previously used as absolute has been 
applied repeatedly and very successfully. The most popular examples are the 
Relativity Principle introduced by Galileo and relativity theory. By the Galileo’s 
Principle of Relativity, the notion of the velocity of an object has been recognized 
as meaningless, unless it is indexed with a reference body with respect to which 
the object is moving. Thus, correct representation of motion demands a definite 
frame of reference. With special relativity, simultaneity of two distant events has 
been recognized as meaningless, unless referred to a specific light signal 
connecting these events.  
In the light of the general theory of information, we can understand the 
relativity principle in quantum physics interpretation in the following way. Any 
(material) thing exists for people only when they get information from (in 
generalized sense, about) this thing. To get information from something, e.g., 
subatomic particle, we need an observer, i.e., recipient of information from this 
object. One may ask a question whether such particles existed before they were 
discovered. Einstein once asked Neils Bohr if the moon exists when no one is 
looking at it. Science gives a positive answer to such questions although, for 
example, there were no observers before these particles were discovered. 
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According to Heisenberg (1958), "The conception of objective reality of the 
elementary particles had thus evaporated … into the transparent clarity of a 
mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of particles but rather our 
knowledge of this behavior." According to the general theory of information, this 
knowledge is formed based on information that we get from particles.  
The Ontological Principles O1 and O4 provide an information theoretical 
explanation for this. Indeed, for existence of something, it is necessary to consider 
observation in a generalized sense. Namely, we do not need any implication that 
the observer, or the observer system in quantum mechanics, is human or has any 
other peculiar property besides the possibility of interacting with the "observed" 
system S.  
If we take the problem of subatomic particle existence for people before these 
particles were discovered, we see that recipients of information existed although 
those recipients did not know that they receive information from particles. For 
instance, psychological experiments show that people receive information but 
cannot identify it on the level of conscience (Luck, et al, 1996). Besides, there are 
several kinds of information in addition to cognitive information (Burgin, 2001). 
To explain this phenomenon and to solve the puzzle of physical existence, let us 
consider the following mental experiment. A particle, say electron, passes through 
a Wilson cloud chamber and produces a visible track of droplets condensed on 
ionized molecules. A digital or film camera makes a picture of this track. Only 
after 30 days, a physicist looks at this picture. It is evident that the electron existed 
before the observer looked at the picture and found evidence of its presence. 
Actually, we have information that the electron existed, at least, at the moment 
when it interacted with the molecules in the Wilson cloud chamber.  
The Ontological Principle O1 also correlates with the idea of Roederer (2002) 
and some other researchers that interaction plays very important role in 
information processes. In other words, there exists no explicit information without 
interaction of the carrier of information with the receiver of information. 
However, it is possible to speak of information not only when we have both a 
sender and a recipient because the recipient can extract information from a carrier 
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when the carrier does not send it. So, the classical communication triad (1) is not 
necessary for existence of information.  
 
Information 
Sender                                         Receiver/Receptor          (1) 
 
The intrinsic necessary structure is the input information triad (2). 
 
 
Information 
Carrier                                         Receiver/Receptor     (2) 
 
 
Note that in many situations, it is possible to treat a set or a sequence of carriers as one 
carrier. However, the structure of a carrier, e.g., whether it is integral or consists of separate 
parts, and the history of its interactions with the receptor can be important for some 
problems. 
The triad (2) is complemented by the output information triad (3). 
 
Information 
Sender                                         Carrier          (3) 
 
Together the output and input information triads form the communication triad 
(1) as their sequential composition. Note that it is possible that the carrier of 
information in the information triads (2) and/or (3) coincides with the Sender. 
Besides, even if information gives some image of a pattern from a sender, this 
correspondence is not necessarily one-to-one. 
It is also possible to speak about some implicit (potential) information in a 
carrier for a given system as a receptor. 
Being more adequate to reality than previous assumptions about the essence of 
information, the first ontological principle makes it possible to resolve a 
controversy that exists in the research community of information scientists. Some 
suggest that information exists only in society, while others ascribe information to 
any phenomenon. Utilizing the Ontological Principle O1, general theory of 
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information states that if we speak about information for people, then it exists 
only in society because now people exist only in society. However, when we 
consider a more general situation, then we see that information exists in 
everything and it is only a problem how to extract it. 
Thus, the first principle explicates an important property if information, but 
says nothing what information is. This is done by the second principle that has 
several forms.  
Ontological Principle O2 (the General Transformation Principle).  In a 
broad sense, information for a system R is a capacity to cause changes in the 
system R.  
Thus, we can understand information in a broad sense as a capacity (ability or 
potency) of things, both material and abstract, to change other things. 
This definition makes information an extremely widespread and 
comprehensive concept. Nevertheless, this situation well correlates with the 
etymological roots of the term information. This term originated from the Latin 
word 'informare,' which can be translated as 'to give form to,’ ‘to shape,’ or ‘to 
form.' 
 However, as it has happened with many other words, the meaning of the word 
information essentially changed. Since approximately the 16th century, the term 
information appears in ordinary French, English, Spanish and Italian in the sense 
we use it today: 'to instruct,' 'to furnish with knowledge', whereas the ontological 
meaning of  'giving form to something' became more and more obsolete. 
Although, as Capurro thinks (1978; 1991), "information … came to be applied, as 
a more or less adequate metaphor, to every kind of process through which 
something is being changed or in-formed." This opinion strongly supports the 
Ontological Principle O2. 
In addition, the Ontological Principle O2 well correlates with understanding of 
von Weizsäcker (2006/1985), who writes "we rate information by the effect it 
has" and with opinion of Boulding (1956), who writes that messages consist of 
information, while the meaning of a message is the change that it produces in the 
image. The idea that information is some change in the receiver was also proposed 
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by MacKay (1956, 1961, 1969) although he restricted this change only to the 
cognitive system of the receiver. 
Information is a general term. Like any general term, it has particular 
representatives. Such a representative is called a portion of information. For 
instance, information in this sentence is a portion of information. Information in 
this preprint is a portion of information. Information in a book is also a portion of 
information. Information in your head, dear reader, is also a portion of 
information. 
To understand better the situation, let us consider some general terms. For 
instance, a book is a general term. The book that you are reading is a 
representative of this general term. A human being or a reader is a general term. 
At the same time, you, dear reader, is representative for both of these general 
terms. 
Thus, the Ontological Principle O2 implies that information exists only in form 
of portions of information. Informally, a portion of information is such 
information that can be separated from other information. 
Remark 1. In some cases, we use the term "information" instead of the term "a 
portion of information" when it does not cause misunderstanding.  
We also consider such generic terms as a piece of information and a slice of 
information. 
Definition 2. A piece of information is information that comes to a system in 
one interaction of this system. 
Thus, a piece of information is also a portion of information. However, not any 
portion of information is a piece of information. 
Note that the concept of a piece of information is relative, i.e., what is a piece 
of information for one system may be not a piece of information for another 
system. 
Definition 3. A slice of information is a related to some object (domain, 
system or subject) portion of information. 
MacKay suggested (1969) another quantization of information that takes into 
account the following two aspects: 
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1. The inner structure of the information element as a "logical a priori" aspect 
(structural information). 
2. The so-called "weight of evidence" of the individual structural elements as 
an "empirical a posteriori" aspect (metrical information). 
The unit of structural information is called logon. It is assumed that any 
portion of information can be divided into logons. Accordingly logon content, as a 
convenient term for the structural information-content, of a portion of information 
I is defined as the number of logons in I. 
The unit of metrical information is called metron. This unit, metron, is 
defined (MacKay, 1969) "as that which supplies one element for a pattern. Each 
element may be considered to represent one unit of evidence. Thus, the amount of 
metrical information in a pattern measures the weight of evidence to which it is 
equivalent."  
MacKay (1969) tries to make this vague definition a little bit more exact, 
explaining that "the amount of metrical information in a single logon, or its 
metron-content, can be thought of as the number of elementary events which have 
been subsumed under one head or 'condensed' to form it."  
As a result, the descriptive information is represented as an information 
vector in an information space.  
 
Analyzing the Ontological Principle O2, we see that it has several 
consequences. First, it demonstrates that information is closely connected to 
transformation. Namely, it means that information and transformation are 
functionally similar because they both cause changes in a system. At the same 
time, they are different because information is a cause of change, while 
transformation is the change itself, or in other words, transformation is an 
operation, while information is what causes this operation. 
Second, the Ontological Principle O2 explains why information influences 
society and individuals all the time, as well as why this influence grows with the 
development of society. Namely, reception of information by individuals and 
social groups induces transformation. In this sense, information is similar to 
energy. Moreover, according to the Ontological Principle O2, energy is a kind of 
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information in a broad sense. This well correlates with the Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker's idea (cf., for example, (Flükiger, 1995)) that energy might in the end 
turn out to be information. At the same time, the von Weizsäcker's conjecture 
explains the exact correspondence between a characteristic of thermal energy such 
as the thermodynamic entropy given by the Boltzmann-Planck formula S = k⋅ln P 
and a characteristic of information such as the quantity of information given by a 
similar Hartley-Shannon formula I = K⋅ln N.   
Third, the Ontological Principle O2 makes it possible to separate different 
kinds of information. For instance, people as well as any computer have many 
kinds of memory. It is even supposed that each part of the brain has several types 
of memory agencies that work in somewhat different ways, to suit particular 
purposes (Minsky, 1986). It is possible to consider each of these memory agencies 
as a separate system and to study differences between information that changes 
each type of memory. This would help to understand the interplay between 
stability and flexibility of mind, in general, and memory, in particular. 
In addition, information that is considered in theory and practice is only cognitive 
information. At the same time, there are two other types: affective information and 
effective information (Burgin, 2001). For example affective information is very 
important for intelligence. As said Minsky (1998), “Emotion is only a different way 
to think. It may use some of the body functions, such as when we prepare to fight 
(the heart beats faster, etc.). Emotions have a survival value, so that we are able to 
behave efficiently in some situations. Therefore, truly intelligent computers will 
need to have emotions. This is not impossible or even difficult to achieve. Once we 
understand the relationship between thinking, emotion and memory, it will be easy 
to implement these functions into the software.” 
All this shows that the Ontological Principle O2 is very powerful. However, 
the common usage of the word information does not imply such wide 
generalizations as the Ontological Principle O2 does. Thus, we need a more 
restricted theoretical meaning because an adequate theory, whether of the 
information or of anything else, must be in significant accord with our common 
ways of thinking and talking about what the theory is about, else there is the 
 14 
danger that theory is not about what it purports to be about.  Though, on the other 
hand, it is wrong to expect that any adequate and reasonably comprehensive 
theory will be congruent in every respect with common ways of thinking and 
speaking about its subject, just because those ways are not themselves usually 
consistent or even entirely clear. To achieve this goal, we use the concept of an 
infological system IF(R) of the system R to introduce information in the strict 
sense. It is done in two steps. At first, we make the concept of information relative 
and then we choose a specific class of infological systems to specify in the strict 
sense. 
As a model example of an infological system IF(R) of an intelligent system R, 
we take the system of knowledge of R. It is called in cybernetics the thesaurus 
Th(R) of the system R. 
Infological system plays the role of a free parameter in the general theory of 
information, providing for representation in this theory different kinds and types of 
information. Identifying an infological system IF(R) of a system R, we can define 
information relative to this system. This definition is expressed by the following 
principle. 
Ontological Principle O2g (the Relativized Transformation Principle). 
Information for a system R relative to the infological system IF(R) is a capacity to 
cause changes in the system IF(R).  
Now we can define information as the capacity of objects (things, texts, 
signals, etc.) to produce changes into infological system. In a more exact way, 
information for a system R is the capacity of objects to produce changes into an 
infological system IF(R) of R. 
This definition is parallel to the definition of energy as the capacity of a 
physical system to do work, produce heat, light, electricity, motion, chemical 
reactions, etc. (Lindsay, 1971). 
We can see that the direct result of the infological system concept introduction 
results in an even more general than in the Ontological Principle O2 definition of 
information. Indeed, in a general case, we can take as an infological system IF(R) 
of the system R any subsystem of R. In the case when IF(R) of the system R, the 
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Ontological Principle O2g becomes the same as the Ontological Principle O2. At 
the same time, taking different kinds of infological systems, it is possible to 
differentiate different kinds of information, while with respect to the Ontological 
Principle O2 all these kinds are not differentiated. 
Generality of the Ontological Principle O2g allows one to consider energy as a 
specific kind of information. Namely, taking physical bodies (things) as a class M 
of infological systems, we see that information with respect to systems from M is 
what changes material bodies. However, we know that it is energy, which material 
bodies. Thus, energy is information that acts directly at material bodies. Other 
kinds of information act indirectly. Their action is meditated by energy. 
However, being more general, such relativistic definition of information makes 
the concept more exact, flexible and selective than the concept of information in a 
broad sense introduced in the Ontological Principle O2. Information in a broad 
sense encompasses too much for the traditional understanding of information and 
intuition behind this that has been formed by practice of many generations. 
The relativistic definition of information can be tuned up to the diversity of 
existing descriptions, interpretations, definitions, understandings and ideas of 
information. A choice of a definite infological system IF(R) in a system R allows 
a researcher, philosopher or practitioner to find such an interpretation of the 
concept of information that the best suits the goals, problems and tasks of this 
researcher, philosopher or practitioner. 
The symbol IF may be considered as a name (denotation) of an operator that is 
defined in a space of systems of some chosen kind. It may be, in the space of all 
systems although the space of all system is a notion that, like the notion of all sets 
can cause contradictions (cf., for example, (Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel, 1958)). Being 
applied to a system R, the operator IF defines in R its infological system IF(R). 
For instance, taking such systems as people, we can correspond the mind to each 
individual H as an infological system IF(H) of this individual. Another option is 
correspond the system of knowledge of this individual H as her or his infological 
system IF(H). One more option is to correspond the system of beliefs (Bem, 1970) 
of this individual H as her or his infological system IF(H). 
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The infological system becomes a parameter of the definition and allows one to 
vary the scope, meaning and features of the defined concept. As a result, this 
parametric definition makes it possible to overcome the limitations in the theory 
of information imposed by the, so-called, Capurro trilemma (Fleissner and 
Hofkirchner, 1995; Capurro, Fleissner and Hofkirchner, 1999). This trilemma 
states that information may mean either the same at all levels (univocity) or 
something similar at all levels (analogy) or something different at different levels 
(equivocity). In the first case, as Capurro suggests (Capurro, Fleissner and 
Hofkirchner, 1999), "we lose all qualitative differences, as for instance, when we 
say that e-mail and cell reproduction are the same kind of information process. 
Not only the "stuff" and the structure but also the processes in cells and computer 
devices are rather different from each other. If we say the concept of information 
is being analogically used, then we have to state what the "original" meaning is." 
If the concept of information is considered at the human level, then we are 
confronted with anthropomorphism when we use the same concept at a non-
human level. By the same token, we would say that "in some way" atoms "talk" to 
each other, etc. Finally there is equivocity, which means that, for example, 
information in physics and information in education are wholly different concepts. 
In this case, information cannot be a unifying concept any more. Further 
reasoning bring Capurro to the conclusion that "we are faced with infinite 
concepts of information, something which cannot be overlooked by any kind of 
theory."    
However, having a sufficiently variable parameter, we can generate a family of 
concepts that represent existing understandings and interpretations of the word 
information. The relativistic definition of information provides such a flexible 
parameter as the infological system. This definition possesses, at the same time, 
univocity, analogy and equivocity. As a result, this definition encompasses, at the 
same time, the broad concept of information given in the Ontological Principle O2 
and a variety of more restricted concepts. Examples of such more restricted 
concepts are: information as elimination of uncertainty (statistical approach), 
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making a distinction (the approach suggested by Hofkirchner (1999)) or "any 
difference that makes a difference" (the approach suggested by Bateson (2000)). 
Any system can have an infological system and not a single one. Consequently, 
in contrast to the opinion of some researchers, information is important both for 
the biotic and abiotic worlds. Information enters non-living physical world even 
without living beings. 
This implies that for a complex system there are different kinds of information. 
Each type of the infological system determines a specific kind of information. For 
example, information that causes changes in the system of knowledge is called 
cognitive information. Existing approaches to information theory and problems 
with understanding information as natural, social, and technological phenomenon 
resulted in a current situation when researchers consider only cognitive 
information.  
At the same time, Roederer defines information as the agent that mediates the 
correspondence between features or patterns in the source system A and changes 
in the structure of the recipient B. This definition strongly correlates with the 
definition from the Ontological Principle O2a. Taking such infological system as 
genetic memory, we come to the concept of biomolecular information considered 
by Roederer (2002). 
The concept of infological system is very flexible. Indeed, it is possible to 
consider even dynamic infological systems. As Scarrott writes (1989), the most 
basic function of information is to control action in an organized system and 
thereby operate the organization. The concept of infological system allows one to 
reflect this situation, taking behavior of a system as a dynamic infological system. 
Information is such a profound essence that to be able to discern new types of 
information and to become more specific about information per se or information 
in strict sense, we need better understanding of the structure of the world where 
we live. 
As we know, people live in the physical (material) world and many perceive 
that this is the only reality that exists. However, some Eastern philosophical and 
religious systems, e.g., Buddhism, teach that physical reality is a great illusion and 
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the only reality is the spiritual world. As science does not have enough evidence 
to accept or reject this idea, we are not going to discuss it. Nevertheless, science 
has enough evidence to accept existence of the mental world. As states 
contemporary psychology, each individual has a specific inner world, which is 
based on the psyche and forms mentality of the individual. These individual inner 
worlds form the lowest level of the mental world, which complements our 
physical world. 
Some thinkers, following Descartes, consider the mental world as 
independent of the physical world. Others assume that mentality is completely 
generated by physical systems of the organism, such as the nervous system and 
brain as its part. However, in any case, the mental world is different from the 
physical world and constitutes an important part of our reality. 
Moreover, our mentality influences the physical world and can change it. 
We can see how ideas change our planet, create many new things and destroy 
existing ones. Even physicists, who research the very foundation of the physical 
world, developed the, so-called, observer-created reality interpretation of quantum 
phenomena. A prominent physicist, Wheeler, suggests that in such a way it is 
possible to change even the past. He stresses (Wheeler, 1977) that elementary 
phenomena are unreal until observed. This gives a dualistic model of reality. 
However, the dualistic model is not complete. This incompleteness was 
prophesized in ancient Greece and proved by modern science. One of the great 
ideas of ancient Greece is the world of ideas (or forms), the existence of which 
was postulated by Plato. In spite of the attractive character of this idea, the 
majority of scientists and philosophers believe that the world of ideas does not 
exist, because nobody has any positive evidence in support of it. The crucial 
argument of physicists is that the main methods of verification in modern science 
are observations and experiments, and nobody has been able to find this world by 
means of observations and experiments. Nevertheless, there are modern thinkers 
who, like such outstanding scholars as philosopher Karl Popper, mathematician 
Kurt Gödel, and physicist Roger Penrose, continue to believe in the world of 
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ideas, giving different interpretations of this world but suggesting no ways for 
their experimental validation. 
However, science is developing, and this development provided recently for 
the discovery of the world of structures. On the level of ideas, this world may be 
associated with the Platonic world of ideas in the same way as atoms of modern 
physics may be related to the atoms of Democritus. The existence of the world of 
structures is demonstrated by means of observations and experiments. This world 
of structures constitutes the structural level of the world as whole. Each system, 
phenomenon, or process either in nature or in society has some structure. These 
structures exist like things, such as tables, chairs, or buildings, and form the 
structural level of the world. When it is necessary to investigate or to create some 
system or process, it is possible to do this only by means of knowledge of the 
corresponding structure. Structures determine the essence of things. 
Let consider the development of ideas related to the global world structure. 
In the Platonic tradition, the global world structure has the form of three 
interconnected worlds: material, mental, and the world of ideas or forms.  
 World of ideas 
 
Physical world                         Mental world 
 
Figure 1. The Plato triad of the world 
 
However, existence of the world of ideas has been severely criticized. Many 
argue that taking a long hard look at what the Platonist is asking people to believe, 
it is necessary to have faith in another “world” stocked with something called 
ideas. This results in many problems. Where is this world and how do we make 
contact with it? How is it possible for our mind to have an interaction with the 
Platonic realm so that our brain state is altered by that experience? Plato and his 
followers have not provided convincing answers to these questions. 
Popper's ontology consists of three worlds: 
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World 1: Physical objects or states. 
World 2: Consciousness or psychical states. 
World 3: Intellectual contents of books, documents, scientific theories, etc. 
As Popper uses the words information and knowledge interchangeably, World 
3 consists of knowledge and information and we have the following triad. 
 
World (3) of 
 knowledge and information 
 
Physical world (1)                        Mental world (2) 
 
Figure 2. The Popper triad of the world 
 
The Popper triad is much more understandable than the Plato triad because 
people know what knowledge is much better than what ideas are, especially, when 
these are Plato ideas, or forms. 
Other authors refer World 3 to signs in the sense of Charles Pierce, although 
they do not insists that World 3 consists of objects that Pierce would classify as 
signs (cf., for example, (Skagestad, 1993; Capuro and Hjorland, 2003)).  
Only recently, modern science made it possible to achieve a new 
understanding of Plato ideas, representing the global world structure as the 
Existential Triad of the world. In this triad, the Physical (material) World is 
interpreted as the physical reality studied by natural sciences, while ideas or forms 
might be associated with structures, and the Mental World encompasses much 
more than individual conscience (Burgin, 1997; Burgin and Milov, 1999). In 
particular, the Mental World includes social conscience. This social conscience is 
projected on the collective unconscious in the sense Jung (cf. (Jung, 1969)) by the 
process of internalization (Atkinson, et al, 1990). In addition, the World of 
structures includes Popper's World 3 as knowledge, or the intellectual contents of 
books, documents, scientific theories, etc., is a kind of structures that are 
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represented in people's mentality (Burgin, 1997; 2004). 
Thus, the existential triad of the world (the world’s global structure) has the 
following form:  
 
 World of structures 
 
Physical world                         Mental world 
 
Figure 3. The Existential Triad of the world 
 
In the mental world, there are real "things" and "phenomena". For example, 
there exist happiness and pain, smell and color, love and understanding, 
impressions and images (of stars, tables, chairs and etc.). In the physical world, 
there are the real tables and chairs, sun, stars, stones, flowers, butterflies, space 
and time, molecules and atoms, electrons and photons. It has been demonstrated 
(Burgin, 1997) that the world of structures also exists in reality. For instance, the 
fundamental triad described in (Burgin, 2004a) exists in the same way as tables, 
chairs, trees, and mountains exist. Knowledge, per se, forms a component of the 
world of structures. It is an important peculiarity of the world (as a whole) that it 
exists in such a triadic form not as a static entity but as a dynamic structure.  
It is necessary to understand that these three worlds are not separate realities: 
they interact and intersect. Thus, individual mentality is based on the brain, which 
is a material thing. On the other hand, physicists discuss a possibility that 
mentality influences physical world (cf., for example, (Herbert, 1987)), while our 
knowledge of the physical world to a great extent depends on interaction between 
mental and material worlds (cf., for example, (von Baeyer, 2001)). 
Even closer ties exist between structural and material worlds. Actually no 
material thing exists without structure. Even chaos has its chaotic structure. 
Structures do things what they are. For instance, it is possible to make a table from 
different material: wood, plastics, iron, aluminum, etc. What all these things have 
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in common is not their material; it is specific peculiarities of their structure. As 
argue some physicists, physics studies not physical systems as they are but 
structures of these systems, or physical structures. In some sciences, such as 
chemistry, and areas of practical activity, such as engineering, structures play a 
leading role. For instance, the spatial structure of atoms, chemical elements, and 
molecules determines many properties of these chemical systems. In engineering, 
structures and structural analysis even form a separate subject (cf., for example, 
(Martin, 1999)). 
We can see existential triads in every individual and in each computer. An 
individual has the physical component - her body, the mental component studied 
by psychologists, and the structural component, which comprises all structures 
and systems from the other two components. A computer has the physical 
component - its hardware, the mental component, which consists of everything 
that is in computer memory, and a structural component, which comprises all 
structures and systems from the other two components. 
While physical and mental objects have been treated for a long time and thus, 
do not cause difficulties in understanding, structure is a much more imprecise 
concept and needs additional explanation. Here we do not give formal definitions 
of concepts related to the World of Structures as the main topic of the book is 
information. 
Definition 2.1.4. A structural representation R(K) of an entity (system, 
process) K is an abstract (symbolic or mental) image (representation) of K 
consisting of representations of parts (elements, components) of K and 
connections (ties, relations) between them.  
Each system has inherent structural representations. At the same time, 
inherent structural representations are (better or worse) revealed by reflected 
structural representations situated in other systems. 
There are three main types of structural representations: 
1. Material in the Physical World. 
2. Symbolic in the Mental World. 
3. Intrinsic in the Structural World. 
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Definition 4. A structure S(K) is a class of equivalent structural 
representations Ri(K).  
This equivalence depends on the level of structuring. This level determines 
what elements and ties are distinguished. For instance, let us consider three 
functions: f from the set N of all natural numbers into itself, g from the set R of all 
real numbers into itself, and h from the set N into the set R . In mathematics, these 
functions are denoted by f: N → N, g: R → R, and h: N → R . If we treat sets N 
and R as members of the class with the name a mathematical object and do not 
discern them, then all three functions have the same structure of the following 
fundamental triad 
mathematical object 1  →   mathematical object 2 
In contrast to this, if we look upon sets N and R as different mathematical 
object, then all three functions have the different structures, although all of them 
are isomorphic to the fundamental triad.  In the first case, we do not pay attention 
at distinctions between sets N and R, while in the second case, such distinctions 
are essential. As a result, the same systems (objects) acquire different structures: 
in the first case, the structure is •→•, while in the second case, the structure is 
•→○.  
It is possible to ask whether object representation allows us to get objective 
structures of objects, i.e., to explicate structures that exist in reality, or the 
structure of a system depends only on those who build the representation. At first 
glance, the process of structure explication looks very subjective as it rests on how 
distinguishability of elements and ties is defined. However, similar situation exists 
with what people see, hear and describe. For instance, an individual sees a table. 
In this situation, we can ask the question, Is it an image of a real table, an image 
on a screen or only an illusion of the brain? 
Some philosophers, e.g., Berkeley, as well as some religious systems, e.g., 
Buddhism, argue that everything what people perceive by their senses is an 
illusion. 
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In contrast to this, science developed means to discern objective reality from 
illusions. These means are based on repetition of observations and experiments. 
Although these methods are not perfect, they provide for the whole existence of 
science and development of the human civilization based on science as a source of 
the technological progress. 
Analyzing situation with structures as invariant representations of existing 
things (real or abstract systems), we come to the conclusion that structures exist in 
the same way as physical things, such as tables, chairs, and buildings, exist. We 
do not give here explicit proofs of this deep-rooted statement. It is possible to find 
details of these proofs in (Burgin, 1997). 
Formalized abstract structures are studied by pure mathematics. Formalized 
and informal concrete structures are studied by all sciences (natural, social and life 
sciences), applied mathematics and philosophy.  
In modern science and philosophy a general approach based on revealing 
intrinsic structures kept invariant relative to transformations is called 
"structuralism". Structuralists' point of view is that different things and 
phenomena have identical essence if their structures are identical. To investigate a 
phenomenon means for them to find its structure. 
From the beginning structuralism have appeared in linguistics. Although F. 
de Saussure did not use the term "structure" but the term "form", his 
understanding in many respects coincides with the structuralistic approach. The 
terms "structure" and '' the structural linguistics" was introduced by V.Brendal 
(1939). L. Hjelmslev (1958) considered structure as "independent essence with 
inner dependencies". He emphasized that the properties of each element of such 
integrity depend on its structure. 
Afterwards, structuralism was extended to other fields. Levi-Strauss 
developed and successfully applied the structuralistic methods and structural 
analysis in anthropology. On this basis he had restored the common (for all 
cultures) function which intermediates the fundamental contradictions of the 
human existence. This function (in his opinion) has been lost by the modern 
European civilization. 
 25 
Lacan (1977) applied the structural analysis to psychoanalysis. Subconscious 
(in his opinion) is structured as a language. It is possible to describe his main 
conception by the triad: 
 real - imaginary - symbolic 
 Real is treated as chaos, inaccessible is a name. Imaginary is an individual 
variation of the symbolical order. Symbolical order is objective. Lacan has been 
proving the thesis that an idea and existence are not identical: it is a language, 
which is a mediator between them. 
The transition to the study of a structural reality reflects a new stage of the 
structuralistic doctrine. In particular, investigation of the structural level of the 
world and scientific research of structures as real phenomena has made possible to 
find the most basic structure called fundamental triad or named set.  
In a symbolic form, a named set (fundamental triad) X is a triad (X, f, I) where 
X is the support of X and is denoted by S(X), I is the component of names (also 
called set of names or reflector) of X and is denoted by N(X),  and f is the naming 
correspondence (also called reflection) of the named set X and is denoted by 
n(X).  The most popular type of named sets is a named set X = (X, f, I) in which X 
and I are sets and f consists of connections between their elements. When these 
connections are set theoretical, i.e., each connection is represented by a pair (x, a) 
where x is an element from X and a is its name from I, we have a set theoretical 
named set or binary relation. Bourbaki in their fundamental monograph (1960) 
also represent binary relations in a form of a triad (named set).  
However, the study of the World of Structures is only at its beginning. 
The structure of the world induces similar structures in many systems that 
exist in this world. It is true for language, symbols, social institutions and 
organizations, psyche, intelligence and many others. In particular, the world 
structure has definite implications for infological systems.  
When R is a material system, its infological system IF(R) consists of three 
components:  
- the material component, which is a system of physical objects;  
 26 
- the symbolic component realized by the material component;  
- the system of structures, which form the structural component of the 
infological system. 
The symbolic component plays the role of a connecting link between the 
material and structural components. To understand this, let us consider theoretical 
understanding embodied in models for the concept of a symbol. 
If we analyze the usage of the word “symbol,” we come to the conclusion 
that it has three different, however, connected, meanings. In a broad sense, symbol 
is the same as sign. For example, the terms “symbolic system” and “sign system” 
are considered as synonyms, although the first term is used much more often. The 
basic property of the sign is that sign points to something different than itself, 
transcendent to it. 
The second understanding of the word “symbol” identifies symbol with a 
physical sign, that is, some elementary entity inscribed on paper, papyrus or stone, 
presented on the screen of a computer monitor, and so on. Letters are signs and 
symbols at the same time. Decimal digits 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are also 
signs and symbols. 
However, we are interested in the third meaning of the word “symbol” when 
it is considered in a strict sense. Such understanding was developed in semiotics as 
a general theory of signs. Semiotics studies structure of signs and their 
communicative function. As signs exist in a huge diversity of situations, the 
founder of semiotics, Charles Pierce, and his follower Charles Morris, defined 
semiotics very broadly, in the hope that it would influence as many disciplines as 
possible. For instance, Morris wrote (1938): 
"The sciences must look to semiotic for the concepts and general principles 
relevant to their own problems of sign analysis. Semiotic is not merely a science 
among other sciences but an organon or instrument to all sciences."  
Indeed, today semiotics is an important tool in communication research, 
information theory, linguistics and the fine arts, as well as in psychology, 
sociology and esthetics. Yet, although many other disciplines recognize the 
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potential importance of semiotic paradigms for their fields, they have not yet found 
a satisfying way of integrating them in their domain. 
While many use the word symbol in the same contexts as the word sign, the 
French linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, sometimes called the father of theoretical 
linguistics, understood "sign" as a category under "symbol" (Saussure, 1916). To 
represent the main property of signs, de Saussure introduced a structural model of 
sign in the form of the dyadic sign triad by (see figure 4).  
 
signification 
sign                             signified 
Figure 4. The dyadic sign triad of de Saussure 
 
This triad is a kind of the fundamental triad.  
Considering the relation between the concepts sign and symbol, Pierce inverted 
this relation, making sign the general term and symbol its particular case as the 
convention-based sign. According to Pierce, there are three kinds of signs: icon, 
index, and symbol.  
The dyadic sign triad explicates important properties of sign, but not all of 
them. Namely, sign represents something different than itself due to the meaning. 
That is why Pierce extended this dyadic model by further splitting the signified 
into essentially different parts: the sign's object and interpretant (meaning of the 
sign), and thus, coming to the triadic model of a sign, the balanced sign triad:  
 
name/vehicle  
 
object/thing/denotat                             meaning/ interpretant 
Figure 5. The balanced sign triad of Pierce 
 
Thus, in the model of Pierce, a sign is understood as a relation consisting of 
three elements: Name (Vehicle), Object and Meaning of the sign. Usually, a 
physical representation of a sign is what people call sign in everyday life, that is, a 
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sign is some elementary image inscribed on paper, clay tablet, piece of wood or 
stone, presented on the screen of a computer monitor, and so on. 
The balanced sign triad is similar to the existential triad of the World. In it, 
the component name corresponds to the structural world as a syntactic system; the 
component object/denotat correspond (but does not necessarily belongs) to the 
physical world; and the component meaning/interpretant corresponds to the 
mental world as a semantic system. In many cases, the object is a material thing 
and as such, is a part of the physical world. However, object can be non-material 
and thus, does not belong to the physical world in some cases. For instance, the 
word joy is the name of emotion, which is nonmaterial. The word theorem is the 
name of a mathematical statement with definite properties. A statement is also 
nonmaterial. Nevertheless, object as a component of sign plays the same role as 
thing, implying that the Pierce triad is homomorphic to the existential triad. 
An icon looks like what it signifies. Photographs at the level of direct 
resemblance or likeness are therefore heavily iconic.  We all are familiar with 
computer icons, that helped popularize such a word processor as the Word, as well 
as with the pictographs such as are used on "pedestrian crossing" signs. There is no 
real connection between an object and an icon of it other than the likeness, so the 
mind is required to see the similarity and associate an object and its icon. A 
characteristic of the icon is that by observing it, we can derive information about the 
object the icon signifies. The more simplified the image, the less it is possible to 
learn. No other kind of signs gives that kind of pictorial information.  
Pierce divides icons further into three kinds: images, icons and symbols. 
Images have the simplest quality, the similarity of aspect. Portraits and computer 
icons are images. Diagrams represent relationships of parts rather than tangible 
features. Examples of diagrams are algebraic formulae. Finally, metaphors 
possess a similarity of character, representing an object by using a parallelism in 
some other object. Metaphors are widely used in poetry and language, for 
example, the frogs of Aesop who desired a king, computer mouse or vector fields 
in physics. 
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An index has a causal and/or sequential relationship to its signified. A key to 
understanding indices (or indexes) is the verb "indicate", of which "index" is a 
substantive. For instance, indices are directly perceivable events that can act as a 
reference to events that are not directly perceivable, or in other words, they are 
something visible that indicates something out of sight. You may not see a fire, but 
you do see the smoke and that indicates to you that a fire is burning. Words "this", 
“that”, “these”, and “those” like a pointed finger, are also indices. The nature of 
the index can be unrelated to that of the signified, but the connection here is logical 
and organic - the two elements are inseparable - and there is little or no 
participation of the mind.  
Contemporary microphysics is built on indices called subatomic, or 
subnuclear, particles. Physicists cannot see these particles even with the best 
modern microscopes. However, physicists see the results of particle interactions, 
e.g., in the Wilson cloud chamber, and know properties of these particles.  
 
A symbol represents something in a completely arbitrary relationship. The 
connection between signifier and signified depends entirely on the observer, or 
more exactly, what the observer was taught or invented. Symbols are subjective. 
Their relation to the signified object is dictated either by social and cultural 
conventions or by habit. Words are a prime example of signs. Whether as a group 
of sounds or a group of characters, they are only linked to their signified because 
we decide they are  and because the connection is neither physical nor logical, 
words change meaning or objects change names as time goes by. Here it all 
happens in the mind and depends on it.  
However, often, especially in science, people try to create words so that they 
show/explicate connections to the signified. For instance, a computer is called 
computer because it/he/she computes. A teacher is called teacher because she/he 
teaches. Some elementary particles are called neutrons because they are 
electrically neutral, i.e., their electrical charge is zero. 
Symbols are abstract entities, and whenever we use one, we are only 
pointing to the idea behind that symbol. Do you know how computer aliases (or 
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shortcuts) work? You create a file that opens the actual file it refers to. If you trash 
the alias/shortcut, it does not affect the file. Symbols work in exactly the same way 
in relation to the concept they serve. The @, © and $ symbols, logical symbols, 
astrological symbols, road signs, V of victory, all are symbols.  
Pierce divides symbols further into two kinds: a singular symbol denotes 
tangible things, while an abstract symbol signifies abstract notions. However, it is 
not always easy to make a distinction. For example, such symbol as “lion” 
signifies an abstract notion of a lion as a specific animal. At the same time, this 
symbol as “a lion” signifies the set of all lions. Thus, it is more tangible to 
introduce one more class of symbols, which we call general symbols. A general 
symbol signifies both an abstract notion and a collection of things encompassed by 
this notion. For example, “a lover” is a general symbol, while “love” is an abstract 
symbol. 
One and the same word can be used as a name for different symbols and 
even for different types of symbols. For instance, on the social level, the word a 
“field” is used as an individual symbol when it denotes a specific place on the 
Earth. At the same time, it will be an abstract symbol used in mathematical 
community and denoting a specific mathematical structure, or more exactly, two 
kinds of structures – fields in algebra, such as the field of all real numbers, and 
fields in functional analysis, such as a vector field. On another, wider group level, 
the same word is used as a name of some system, such as a field of mathematics, 
field of activity or field of competence. Important examples of symbols are general 
concepts and formal expressions. 
For example, the material component of the infological system of a human 
being is the brain or its part that is called memory. What is commonly called 
memory is not a single, simple system. It is an extraordinarily complex system of 
diverse components and processes. Memory of a person has three, or perhaps even 
more, distinct components (Minsky, 1986). The most important and best 
documented by scientific research are sensory information storage (SIS), short-
term memory (STM), and long-term memory (LTM). Memory researchers do not 
employ uniform terminology. Sensory information storage is also known as 
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sensory register, sensory store, and eidetic and echoic memory. Short- and long-
term memories are also referred to as primary and secondary memory. Each 
component of memory differs with respect to function, the form of information 
held, the length of time information is retained, and the amount of information-
handling capacity. Memory researchers also posit the existence of an interpretive 
mechanism, as well as an overall memory monitor or control mechanism that 
guides interaction among various elements of the memory system. 
The corresponding to the brain symbolic component is the mind. In the case 
of the memory as the material component, we take the symbolic representation of 
the data and knowledge system as the corresponding symbolic component. 
Actually any entity can be used as a symbol, even a process. For instance, 
neurons do not have memory. However, neural networks allow one to organize 
some kind of memory, being capable of storing and retrieving data from this 
memory. There are two formats for saving data: static and dynamic. Dynamic 
storage is utilized for temporary data. In this case, a part of a network is used only 
for preserving information. If we take a neuron, which can be in two states: firing 
and silent, then it is possible to interpret a silent neuron as containing the symbol 
‘0’, while a firing neuron is considered as containing the symbol ‘1’. When a 
neuron can fire several kinds of output, for example any rational number, then we 
can store in it more than two symbols. To preserve the firing state, a neuron can be 
initiated to circulate in a loop, until it is stopped. Since the output of the neuron 
feeds back to itself, there is a self-sustaining loop that keeps the neuron firing even 
when the top input is no longer active. Activating the lower input suppresses the 
looped input, and the node stops firing. The stored binary bit is continuously 
accessible by looking at the output. This configuration is called a latch. Thus, a 
symbol, e.g., 1, is stored in form of a process in a neural network. Consequently, 
this process becomes a symbol itself. Existence of such memory is supported by 
the experimental evidence that some patterns in the brain are preserved in a 
dynamical fashion (Suppes and Han, 2000). 
The corresponding to the brain structural component includes knowledge of 
the individual. Structural component also includes beliefs, attitudes (Bem, 1970), 
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images, ideas, conjectures, problems, etc. However, we can take the system of 
knowledge, also called thesaurus, as an infological system of the brain, or of an 
individual. Infological elements in this case will be units of knowledge of the 
individual.  
Another example of an infological system is the memory of a computer. 
Such a memory is a place in which data and programs are stored. Data and 
programs are represented by symbols in a material form: as states of electronic 
elements or written on paper, board or some other material objects. At the same 
time, data texts, symbols, knowledge, programs, algorithms and many other 
essences are structures (Burgin, 1997; 2004; 2005). 
The computer memory is also a complex system of diverse components and 
processes. Memory of a computer includes such three components as the random 
access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), and secondary storage. While 
RAM forgets everything whenever the computer is turned off and ROM cannot 
learn anything new, secondary storage devices allow the computer to record 
information for as long period of time as we want and change it whenever we 
want. Now the following devices are utilized for log-term computer memory: 
magnetic tapes and corresponding drives, magnetic disks and corresponding 
drives, and optical disks and corresponding drives. 
Remark 2. In an arbitrary system R, it is possible to select different 
infological systems. Fixing one of these subsystems, we determine the type of 
information for R and changing our choice of IF(R) we change the scope of 
information entities (portions of information).  
For example, computers have different kinds of memory: processor 
registers, addressed memory, main storage, buffer storage, external storage, 
working storage etc. Each of them or any combination of them may be considered 
as an infological system of a computer R. If the processor registers are treated as 
an infological system, then a program (even such that is kept in the main storage 
of this computer) does not have information for R until execution of instructions 
from this program begins.  
Definition 4. Elements from IF(R) are called infological elements.  
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There is no exact definition of infological elements although there are 
various entities that are naturally considered as infological elements as they allow 
one to build theories of information that inherit conventional meanings of the word 
information. For instance, knowledge, data, images, ideas, fancies, abstractions, 
beliefs, and similar objects are standard examples of infological elements. If we 
consider only knowledge and data, then the infological system is the system of 
knowledge of a given system R. Such a system of knowledge is called a thesaurus 
in cybernetics.  
The situation with infological elements looks similar to the situation in 
contemporary physics where physicists do not give a definition of matter but 
explain how matter is built and what elements of matter are. As such elements on 
the lowest level of the hierarchy, physicists take subatomic particles, physical 
fields, atoms, molecules and so on. 
The infological system plays the role of a free parameter in the definition of 
information (cf. the Ontological Principle O2g). One of the ways to vary this 
parameter is to choose a definite kind of infological elements. Additional 
conditions on infological elements imply a more restricted concept of information. 
To better understand how infological system can help to explicate the 
concept of information in the strict sense, we consider cognitive infological 
systems. 
Definition 5. An infological system IF(R) of the system R is called 
cognitive if IF(R) contains (stores) such elements or constituents as knowledge, 
data, images, ideas, fancies, abstractions, beliefs, etc. 
Cognitive infological system is a standard example of infological systems, 
while its elements, such as knowledge, data, images, ideas, fantasies, abstractions, 
and beliefs, are standard example of infological elements. Cognitive infological 
system is very important, especially, for intelligent systems. The majority of 
researchers believe that information is intrinsically connected to knowledge (cf. 
Flückiger, 1995).  
The system of knowledge KIF(R) of R is an infological system of an 
intelligent system R. In cybernetics, it is called the thesaurus Th(R) of the system R. 
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A thesaurus is a part of a cognitive infological system. Another example of an 
infological system is the memory of a computer. Such a memory is a place in which 
data and programs are stored. 
A cognitive infological system of R is denoted by CIF(R) and is related to 
cognitive information. 
Ontological Principle O2c (the Cognitive Transformation Principle). 
Cognitive information for a system R, is a capacity to cause changes in the 
cognitive infological system IFC(R) of the system R.   
As the cognitive infological system contains knowledge of the system it 
belongs, cognitive information is the source of knowledge changes. This perfectly 
correlates with the approach of Dretske (1983) and Goldman (1967) who defined 
knowledge as information-caused belief, i.e., information produces beliefs that 
are called knowledge. Moreover, it is impossible to obtain knowledge without 
information. Dretske (1983) develops this idea, implying that information 
produces beliefs, which, according to our definition, are also elements of the 
cognitive infological system. Moreover, many researchers relate all information 
exclusively to knowledge. For instance, Mackay writes (1969): 
“Suppose we begin by asking ourselves what we mean by information. 
Roughly speaking, we say that we have gained information when we know 
something now that we didn't know before; when ‘what we know’ has changed.” 
Barwise and Seligman write (1997) that "information is closely tied to 
knowledge." Cognitive information related to knowledge was also studied by 
Shreider (1967).  
At the same time, other researchers connect cognitive information to 
experience. For instance, Boulding (1956) calls a collection of experiences by the 
name image and explains that messages consist of information as they are 
structured experiences, while the meaning of a message is the change that it 
produces in the image. 
Cognitive information is what people, as a rule, understand and mean when 
they speak about information. Indeed, since approximately the 16th century, we 
find the word information in ordinary French, English, Spanish and Italian in the 
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sense we use it today: to instruct, to furnish with knowledge (Capurro, 1991). 
However, scientific usage of the notion of information (cf, for example, 
(Loewenstein, 1999)) implies a necessity to have a more general definition. For 
instance, Heidegger pointed to the naturalization of the concept of information in 
biology in the form of genetic information (Heidegger and Fink, 1970). An 
example, of such a situation is when biologists discuss information in DNA in 
general or in the human genom, in particular. 
As a result, we come to the world of structures. Change of structural features 
of a system, and through them other system characteristics, is the essence of 
information in the strict sense. This correlates with the von Weizsäker's remark 
that information being neither matter nor energy, according to (Wiener, 1961), has 
a similar status as the "platonic eidos" and the "Aristotelian form" (Weizsäcker, 
1974).   
 
Ontological Principle O2a (the Special Transformation Principle). 
Information in the strict sense or, simply, information for a system R, is a 
capacity to change structural infological elements from an infological system 
IF(R) of the system R.   
To understand this principle and the definition of information it contains, we 
need to understand the concept of a structure. Otherwise, this definition will be 
incomplete, containing an undefined term. This brings us to the most fundamental 
question of ontology how our world is organized (built). 
Some researchers related information to structure of an object. For instance, 
information is characterized as a property of how entities are organized and 
arranged, not the property of entities themselves (Reading, 2006). Other 
researchers related information to form and form is an explicit structure of an 
object. For instance, information is characterized as an attribute of the form (in-
form-ation) that matter and energy, not of the matter and energy themselves 
(Dretske, 2000). 
However, absence of the exact concept of structure and lack of 
understanding that structures can objectively exist result in contradictions and 
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misconceptions. For instance, a researcher writes that information is simply a 
construct used to explain causal interaction, and in the next sentence, the same 
researcher asserts that information is a fundamental source of change in the natural 
world. However, constructs cannot be sources of change, they can only explain 
change. 
The Ontological Principle O2a implies that information is not of the same 
kind as knowledge and data, which are structures (Burgin, 1997). Actually, if we 
take that matter is the name for all substances as opposed to energy and the 
vacuum, we have the relation that is represented by the following diagram called 
the Structure-Information-Matter-Energy (SIME) Square. 
 
 
similar 
Energy        ≈         Information 
 
 
                                         contains                                             contains 
similar 
Matter             ≈         Structures 
 
Figure 6. The Structure-Information-Matter-Energy (SIME) Square 
 
In other words,  
Information is related to knowledge and data as energy is related to matter. 
Here it is necessary to remark that many people think and write that there is no 
distinction between matter and energy. They base their belief on the famous 
formula from the relativistic physics 
E = mc2                 (4) 
However, this belief is only a misconception because the letter m in (4) does 
not stand for matter, as well as the letter E in (4) does not stand for energy. Here m 
means “mass” and E means the quantity of energy. “Mass” is only one of the 
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characteristics or measures of material objects. What concerns the symbol E in (4), 
it is necessary to make a distinction between energy as a natural phenomenon and 
energy as some physical quantity. The latter is a measure of the former. It is 
natural to cal this quantity by the name “the quantity of energy.” However, 
traditionally it is also called energy. There are other measures of energy. For 
instance, entropy is another measure of thermal energy.  
Besides, what Einstein really proved was that if a body at rest emits a total 
energy of E remaining at rest, then the mass of this body decreases by E/ c2. 
Thus, formula (4) gives a relation between two measures of two distinct 
natural phenomena. Namely, this formula estimates how much energy is stored in 
matter. 
The reasoning that formula (4) means absence of distinction between energy 
and matter is similar to the following argumentation. Let M be a man, T be a tree, 
and h(x) denotes the height of x. Then some can (incorrectly) say that the formula 
h(M) = h(T) means that there is no distinction between M and T. Although this 
fallacy is more evident than the fallacy of equating energy and matter, both 
fallacies have the same nature. 
It is important to understand that saying or writing that matter contains 
energy or knowledge contains information is not the same as saying that a bottle 
contains water. The meaning of the expression “knowledge contains information” 
is similar to the meaning of expressions “the brain contains knowledge” or “a 
person has knowledge.” In other words, it is possible to extract energy from 
matter, as well as it is possible to extract information from knowledge. In some 
cases, such extraction goes on automatically (on the unconscious level). It gives 
an illusion that information comes itself into a system. 
It is possible to reproach that the concept of an infological system is too 
ambiguous and fuzzy. However, ambiguity may be a positive property if you can 
use it. For example, if you can control and change ambiguity, it becomes not an 
ambiguity but a parameter that is utilized to tune and control the system. 
This is just the case with the infological system in general theory of 
information. Thus, it is natural that considering a human being, we do not chose 
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the same infological systems as we do for biological cells or computers. Besides, 
any complex system has, as a rule, several infological systems. 
The main infological system of an individual is the mind with its material 
component – the brain. This infological system controls all human actions. As a 
result, behavior of people is determined by information that flows in the organism 
of this individual. It allows individual to adapt to environment both in nature and 
society. 
A possibility to choose an infological system in a different way is very 
beneficial. It explicates existence of different types and kinds of information. 
Each type of information corresponds to some type of infological system. 
Examples of such types are considered elsewhere. 
In what follows, we consider only information in the strict sense.      
It is possible to separate (cf., for example, (Flükiger, 1995)) three 
approaches to information: information as a thing, information as a structure, and 
information as a property. It is possible to ask which of these approaches is true. 
The general theory of information supports the third approach. 
Let us consider a situation when one system Q sends a signal to another 
system R. This signal carries a message, which, in turn, contains information. 
Let I be a portion of information for a system R. 
   Ontological Principle O3 (the Embodiment Principle). For any portion of 
information I, there is always a carrier C of this portion of information for a 
system R.  
Really, people get information from books, magazines, TV and radio sets, 
computers, and from other people. To store information people use their brains, 
paper, tapes, and computer disks. All these entities are carriers of information. 
For adherents of the materialistic approach, the Ontological Principle O3 must 
be changed to its stronger version.  
Ontological Principle OM3 (the Material Embodiment Principle). For any 
portion of information I, there is some substance C that contains I.  
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For example, according to Landauer (2002), information is always physical 
and hence ultimately quantum mechanical. However, what Landauer really 
claims is that nobody can have information without some physical carrier. People 
often confuse information with its carrier. From this confusion, such definitions 
as "information is a message" or "information is a collection of facts and data" or 
"information is knowledge derived from something" come. 
However, if we identify information with its carrier, then we would inevitably 
come to the paradoxical conclusion suggested by Furner (2004) that information 
studies do not need the concept of information. 
In reality, the situation is opposite. It is not the case when information laws are 
derived from physical laws, as Landauer (2002) suggested, but physical laws that 
are derived from information laws as the title of the book "Physics from Fisher 
information" (Frieden, 1998) states. 
Definition 6. The substance C that is physical carrier of the portion of 
information I is called the physical, or material, carrier of I. 
In a general case, carriers of information belong to three classes: material, 
mental, and structural. For example, let us consider a book. It is a physical carrier 
of information. However, it contains information only because some meaningful 
text is printed in it. Without this text it would not be a book. The text is the 
structural carrier of information in the book. Besides, the text is understood if it 
represents some knowledge and/or other structures from the cognitive infological 
system. This knowledge and other corresponding structures form the mental 
carrier of information in the book. 
Two of the three types of information carriers are related to elements of the 
basic triplet (triad) of Jumarie (1986): the system S that is the material medium 
where information is physically defined; the universe of discourse U where 
information is semasiologically defined; and the observer R who considers S and 
U in his own subjective framework.  The system S that is the material medium 
where information is physically defined corresponds to the physical carrier of 
information. The universe of discourse U where information is semasiologically 
defined corresponds to the structural carrier of information. The observer R who 
 40 
considers S and U in his own subjective framework corresponds to the mental 
carrier of information. 
Distinctions between types of information carriers are of a great importance 
when something (such as a film or educational computer program) is produced 
for communication or/and entertainment. To achieve better information 
transmission, it is necessary to pay attention how all three types of information 
carriers are organized and produced. 
Some people think that only physical matter is what gives emergent properties. 
They claim that with the same physical matter and with exactly the same physical 
structure, e.g., all microparticles and their states and coordinates, it is possible to 
get the same informational content. As a consequence, they believe, it is 
impossible to change informational content without changing the material 
representation of information. 
This looks so evident. However, our practice shows that this is not the case. 
Let us consider a textbook on physics written in Japanese. To an individual who 
does not know either Chinese or physics, this book will give very little (if any) 
information. To an individual who knows physics but does not know Japanese, 
this book will give more information because this person will understand 
formulas. To an individual who knows Japanese but does not know physics, this 
book will give much more information. This person will be able to learn physics 
using this textbook However, to an individual who knows both Chinese and 
physics to a higher degree that this textbook represents, this book will also give 
very little (if any) information. Thus, the material representation of information in 
the book is not changing, while the content is different for different people. That 
is, what information is in the same material representation depends on means that 
the receiver of this information has for information extraction. 
This conclusion is supported by statements of experts in statistical information 
theory where information content of a message depends on knowledge of the 
recipient/receiver.  
Existence of a definite information carrier allows one to speak about this 
carrier as a representation of information. According to the Ontological Principle 
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O2, information is the same if it causes the same changes in a given infological 
system. Thus, the same information can be represented in different information 
carriers, e.g., by different texts, or even by information carriers of different 
nature, e.g., there cases when it is possible to convey the same information by an 
oral message, written or printed text, and picture. 
However, there is a difference between information carrier and information 
representation. An information carrier only contains information, while an 
information representation contains and represents information. Thus, an 
information representation is always its carrier, while an information carrier is not 
always an information representation. An information carrier is a broader concept 
than a representation of information. For instance, a text written on a piece of 
paper is a representation of information and a carrier of this information as well. 
At the same time, the piece of paper with this text is only a carrier of the 
corresponding information. Note that one portion of information I can represent 
another portion of information J. Thus, I will be a carrier of J, but it will be a 
non-material carrier. A symbol is only partially a material carrier of information. 
Here are some more examples of information carriers and information 
representations. A file that contains some text is both a representation and carrier 
of information, but the computer where this file is stored is a carrier but hardly a 
representation of information in the file. A human being is a carrier but not, as a 
rule, representation of information she or he has. 
 
Ontological Principle O4 (the Embodiment Principle). For any portion of 
information I, there is always a representation C of this portion of information 
for a system R.   
 
The first three ontological principles  ((O1)-(O3) or  (O1)-(OM3)) imply that, 
in some sense, information connects the carrier C with the system R and thus, 
information is a component of the following fundamental triad (Burgin, 2004a): 
(C, I, R)                            (5) 
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As a rule, there is some channel through which information comes from C to R. 
For example, The carrier C of I is a piece of paper and R is a person reading the text 
written on C. Then the corresponding channel is the space between the paper and the 
eyes of the person. 
People empirically observed that for information to become available, the 
carrier must interact with a receptor that is capable to of detecting information the 
carrier contains. The empirical fact is represented by the following principle.  
Ontological Principle O5 (the Interaction Principle). A 
transaction/transition/transmission of information goes on only in some 
interaction of C with R.  
This principle introduces the interaction triad (6) in the theory of information. 
Int 
C  →  R              (6) 
 
Interaction between C and R may be direct or indirect, i.e. it is realized by 
means of some other objects.  
The property of information explicated in the Ontological Principle O5 may 
look evident. However, it has important consequences, For example, if you know 
that some information has passed from system to another and want to find how it 
happened, you have to look for a channel of transaction. Although, if it is known 
only that the second system possesses the same information as the first one, it not 
necessary that it has been a transmission. It might be possible that the same 
information has been created by the second system. Existence of a channel makes 
transmission possible but does not necessitates it. 
The next principle is a detailing of the Ontological Principle O5. 
Ontological Principle O5a (the Structured Interaction Principle). A system 
R receives information I only if some carrier C of information I transmits I to the 
system R or R extracts this information from C.  
Information transmission/extraction can be direct or go through some channel 
ch. When somebody touches a hot rod and feels that the rod is hot, it is a direct 
information transmission from the rod to this person. At the same time, when 
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somebody comes close to a hot rod and feels that the rod is hot, it is a indirect 
information transmission from the rod to this person because such a channel as 
the air is used.  
Here, we have two ways of information transaction: transmission and 
extraction. Transmission of information is the passive transaction with respect to 
R when R receives information and active transaction with respect to C when C 
transmits information. Extraction of information is the active transaction with 
respect to R when R extracts information and passive transaction with respect to 
C when information is taken from C. When the carrier C is the system R itself, 
then we have the third type of information operations – information processing. It 
includes information transformation and production (Burgin, 1997b). 
These two ways of information exchange reflect important regularities of 
education and entertainment media. At first, let us consider education where these 
features emerged much earlier than in entertainment.  
There is an essential difference between Western and Eastern approaches to 
education. The main principle of the Western tradition is that a teacher comes to 
students to teach them. Contrary to this, the main principle of the Eastern 
tradition is that a student comes to teacher to learn from him. This means that the 
Western approach is based on information transmission, while the Eastern 
approach stems from information extraction. 
This is an essential difference. When students come to school without 
preparing to work hard to get knowledge and only wait when the teacher will put 
everything in their head, the results usually are not good. Such students either do 
not receive knowledge or receive mush less than they can and what the teacher 
gives them. In fact, any teacher gives his students only information, while 
students themselves have to accept this information and to transform it to 
knowledge. This transformation demands substantial work. Gifted students do 
this work in their brains, often subconsciously. This creates an impression that 
they do nothing to achieve excellent results in learning. Not so gifted students 
need to work hard to achieve sufficient results in learning. It is a responsibility of 
a teacher to teach her students how to efficiently acquire information. Many 
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problems with education, even in developed countries, are connected to the 
misconception that a teacher has to give knowledge to her students. This orients 
the teacher to give more subject material to students without taking sufficient care 
of helping the students to accept information in this material and to build 
knowledge using accepted information. 
A similar situation, for example, exists in entertainment. To make it clear, let 
us consider theater, movies, television, and computer games. Theater evidently 
represents the Eastern position. Spectators come to the theater where plays are 
created. Film industry creates movies not in the presence of the audience. 
However, people have to come to movie theaters to see movies. TV, radio, and 
DVDs, as it is peculiar for the Western tradition, come to each home, making 
entertainment consumption easier. Computer games and other computer 
entertainment, in the majority of cases, are also coming to the audience. 
However, this audience consists not of the spectators but of participants. Modern 
technology provides for the film industry opportunities to come directly to the 
audience by means of the video. Thus, technology, mostly created in the West, 
supports and promotes active approach of producers at the cost of transformation 
of the audience (of spectators, students, etc.) into passive consumers. This is an 
essential trait of our society. 
At the same time, the same Western technology has developed means for 
active participation in entertainment. Computer games represent only the first 
step in this direction. 
The Ontological Principle O4a introduces the second communication triad (7) 
in the theory of information. 
channel 
C      →      R              (7) 
 
 
Two more principles explicate dynamic properties of information processes. 
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   Ontological Principle O6 (Actuality Principle).  A system R accepts a 
portion of information I only if the transaction/transition/transmission causes 
corresponding transformations. 
For example, if after reading this paper, your knowledge remains the same, 
you do not accept cognitive information from this text. That is why, the concern 
of the people from the entertainment industry how their production influences the 
intended audience is the greatest importance to the industry. General theory of 
information can explain many features of this impact. However, this theory does 
not solve all problems, and to have a complete picture, it is necessary to include 
sociologists, psychologists, economists, linguists, and semiologists in the study of 
entertainment. 
 Ontological Principle O7 (the Multiplicity Principle). One and the same 
carrier C can contain different portions of information for one and the same 
system R .  
    Really, let us consider some person A as the system R and a book written in 
Japanese as the carrier C. At first, A does not know Japanese and C contains 
almost no information for A. After some time, A learns Japanese, reads the book 
C and finds in it a lot of valuable information for himself. Note that knowing 
Japanese A is, in some sense, another person. 
Another example is given by advertising. It changes comprehension of 
different thing including entertainment. Let us consider a situation when some 
person A comes to a movie theater to see a new film. It is, as a rule a great 
difference in comprehension depending whether this person never has heard 
about this film or A has read quite a deal about good actors, talented producer, 
interesting plot of the film and so on. 
In other words, if you want to convey some information to an audience 
efficiently, you have to prepare this audience to acceptation of the transferred 
information. This is essentially important for contemporary entertainment 
industry based on mass communication. 
There are many examples when unprepared community did not accept even 
the highest achievements of human intellect and creativity. Thus, it is known that 
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when many outstanding works of art were created and many great discoveries in 
science were made, society did not understand what was done and rejected in 
some cases the highest achievements of geniuses. Only consequent generations 
understood the greatness of what had been done before. As examples, we can 
take the great Austrian composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, who died in 
poverty, the great mathematicians Evariste Galois and Niels Hendrik Abel, who 
wrote outstanding works but were neglected and died at young age because of 
this.  
One more example of misunderstanding gives the life of the great English 
physicist Paul Dirac. He was well-known and respected by physical community 
when he theoretically discovered a positive “electron”, which was later called 
positron. However, other physicists did not understand Dirac’s achievement and 
even mocked at him. 
The great German mathematician Gauss made one of the most outstanding 
discoveries of the 19th century, the discovery of the non-Euclidean geometry. 
Nevertheless, he did not want to publish his discovery because correctly 
considered the contemporary mathematical community unprepared to the 
comprehension of this discovery. 
   The last three principles reflect only the situations when transformation of an 
infological system takes place. However, it is important to know and predict 
properties of these transformations, for example, to evaluate the extent or 
measure of transformations. These aspects of the general theory of information 
are treated elsewhere. 
It is true, to be sure, that an adequate theory, whether of information or 
anything else, must be in significant accord with our common ways of thinking 
and talking about what the theory is. Else there is the danger that the theory is not 
about what it purports to be about. Taking into account this aspect, we see that the 
general theory of information does not completely eliminate common 
understanding of the word information. This theory allows one to preserve 
common usage in a modified and refined form. Let us look how we change those 
expressions that are used as substitutes for the term information in the American 
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Heritage Dictionary (1996). The general theory of information suggests that it is 
more adequate to say and write that information gives knowledge of a specific 
event or situation. When people say and write that information is a collection of 
facts or data (The American Heritage Dictionary, 1996), the general theory of 
information suggests that it is more adequate to say and write that a collection of 
facts or data contains information. 
According to the Dictionary, Information is: 1. Knowledge derived from 
study, experience, or instruction. 2. Knowledge of a specific event or situation; 
intelligence. 3. A collection of facts or data: "statistical  information." 4. The act 
of informing or the condition of being informed; communication of knowledge: 
"Safety instructions are provided for the information of our passengers." 5. (in 
Computer Science) A nonaccidental signal or character used as an input to a 
computer or communications system. 6. A numerical measure of the uncertainty 
of an experimental outcome. 7. (in Law) A formal accusation of a crime made by 
a public officer rather than by grand jury indictment. 
According to the general theory of information, more adequate expressions are: 
1. Knowledge derived from information obtained from study, experience, or 
instruction. 2. Information gives knowledge of a specific event or situation; or 
information provides intelligence. 3. A collection of facts or data contains 
(statistical) information. 4. The act of informing or the condition of being 
informed; communication. 5. A nonaccidental signal or character used as an input 
to a computer or communications system contains information. 6. A numerical 
measure of the uncertainty of an experimental outcome is a measure of 
information. 7. A formal accusation of a crime made by a public officer contains 
information on who committed the crime. 
It is possible to do similar transformations with the following definitions of 
information given in the Roget’s New Thesaurus (1995): 1. That which is known 
about a specific subject or situation: data, fact (used in plural), intelligence, 
knowledge, lore. 2. That which is known; the sum of what has been perceived, 
discovered, or inferred: knowledge, lore, wisdom.  
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According to the general theory of information, more adequate expressions 
are: 1. That which is known about a specific subject or situation, i.e., data, facts, 
intelligence, knowledge, and lore, contain information. 2. That which is known 
contains information; the sum of what has been perceived, discovered, or inferred 
contains information, i.e., knowledge and lore contain information, while wisdom 
assumes possession of big quantity of information, i.e., a wise person has a lot of 
information.  
This analysis of the common usage of the word information shows that the 
general theory of information does not essentially reverse the conventional 
meaning. The theory makes this meaning more precise by separating information 
from its representation. In our everyday speech, we do not differentiate between 
information and its representation. As a rule, it does not matter. However, this 
differentiation can be important in science and even in the every day 
communication, for example, when we need to find the intended meaning of a 
message, going beyond its literal understanding. 
Principles of the general theory of information are introduced to reflect basic 
properties of information. But principles do not allow one to achieve the 
necessary exactness. That is why, mathematical structures are utilized, while 
principles are converted to postulates and axioms of the general theory of 
information are introduced.  These postulates and axioms give an exact 
mathematical reflection of the main principles and provide for elaboration of a 
general axiomatic theory of information, which is based on the theory of named 
sets (fundamental triads).  Fundamental triads are used for construction of the 
mathematical part of the general theory of information.  
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